Legislation: The current anti-corruption legislation dates back to the Prevention of Corruption Act, No. 16 of 1971. The Anti-Money Laundering Act was enacted in 2006, while in 2007, as a revision of the existing anti-corruption legislation, the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act (PCCA) was enacted in order to implement the United Nations Convention against Corruption and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. Corruption is criminalised under the PCCA, which covers attempted corruption, extortion, passive and active bribery, money laundering, and bribing a foreign official. The intention has been to bring together and strengthen existing anti-corruption legislation and institutions, as well as to expand the range of corruption offences and add provisions to tackle private sector corruption. Nevertheless, according to the US Department of State 2009, Tanzania is characterised by a weak anti-money laundering regulatory framework, in particular with regards to financial institutions and law enforcement capabilities. A Freedom of Information Bill continues to remain in the legislative pipeline, even though it has been criticised for containing many exemptions for accessing government records. As an example, it has been revealed that the bill allows the government to block publication of information that is not 'in the public interest'. Corruption is designated as an economic offence, and provisions exist for imprisonment, but there are no financial penalties for economic crimes except for the recovery of assets. See ISS Africa's overview of Tanzanian corruption legislation or access the Lexadin World Law Guide for a collection legislation in Tanzania.

Government Strategies: Much of the current anti-corruption efforts can be traced back to 1996, when former President Benjamin W. Mkapa created the Presidential Commission of Inquiry Against Corruption (the Warioba Commission). The Warioba Commission produced the Warioba Report, which identified areas where corruption occurs and revealed mechanisms in the society that generate corruption. Today it is regarded as one of the most profound analyses of corruption by any African state and has helped to open up public discussion on corruption. The government's practical response to both the Warioba Report and the ensuing public debates on corruption was to launch the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan 2000-2005 (NACSAP I) in 1999. It was mandated to a) carry out relevant institutional reforms to eradicate corruption, b) implement a public awareness campaign against corruption, and c) bring together stakeholders working on rooting-out corruption in Tanzania. The NACSAP led to the establishment of a number of anti-corruption bodies, including the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau, the Ethics Inspectorate Department and a strengthened Controller and Auditor General. In December 2006, the NACSAP-II was launched for the period up to 2011. The aim of this second phase of the NACSAP was to include local government authorities, civil society and the private sector under the national anti-corruption strategy. A Triangulation Partnership Programme (NATPP) was established in 2005, aiming to coordinate joint supportive efforts of civil society, government and the private sector directed towards the NACSAP. The government also participated in a pilot programme to test methodologies for the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) implementation review. The corresponding 2010 country report was the outcome of a peer review process and assessed the implementation of selected UNCAC articles. 

Anti-Corruption Agency: Tanzania's first anti-corruption agency dates back to 1974 when the passing of Act No. 2 mandated the establishment of an Anti-Corruption Squad. In 1991, the squad was restructured and the name changed to the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB). In July 2007, the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) was abolished and replaced by the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act (PCCA) which renamed the PCB the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB). The PCCB is an independent body under Section 5 of the PCCA. Part 2, Article 7 of the PCCA empowers the PCCB in seven areas: 1) to give advice on the practices and procedures of the public, parastatal and private sectors in order to facilitate the prevention and detection of corruption; 2) to disseminate information about the negative consequences of corrupt practices to the public; 3) enlist and foster public support in combating corrupt practices; 4) to give advice to the public, parastatal and private sectors on how to prevent corruption; 5) to cooperate with international institutions and agencies to combat corruption; 6) to investigate and prosecute corruption offences subject to the instructions of the Director of Public Prosecutions; and 7) to investigate any alleged attempted or committed corruption offence. According to the PCCB case statistics 2009, there were 41,177 alleged cases (not all cases were related to corruption) between 1995 and 2009. Of the reports investigated, 190 corruption cases resulted in convictions, 904 public servants were sanctioned for corrupt practices and more than TZS 87 billion was recovered during this period. Critics have pointed towards the PCCB's lack of independence as a significant problem hindering its performance. According to Global Integrity 2010, the PCCB is not protected from political interference in practice. Similarly, according to the report, appointments to this anti-corruption agency are sometimes made based on political considerations, and individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties. Appointments of the PCCB's Director General and the Deputy of Director General are made by the President, and the agency is unable to prosecute cases of corruption involving public officers without the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions, which is reportedly often difficult to obtain. Furthermore, according to Global Integrity 2010, even though the PCCB's number of employees was increased from 700 in 2005 to 1,700 in 2010, nevertheless, the report assesses that the agency lacks significant powers, which in turn limit its effectiveness. However, in the wake of the recently revealed corruption scandals some politicians have expressed the need for a law that would make the PCCB an autonomous institution, in order to give it more power to deal with dubious top government officials. For further information on the PCCB, see the Strategic Plan for 2008-2013 and a legal expert review of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bill.

Controller and Auditor General (CAG): The Public Finance Act No. 6 and the Public Procurement Act No. 3 enacted in 2001 have strengthened the possibilities of oversight by the Auditor General in public procurement and finances. The CAG receives regular funding but is understaffed and lacks resources. The CAG makes annual reports, however, the reports are difficult to access, and the government rarely acts on them. Its independence is guaranteed in the constitution, and the budget is determined by the executive. According to Global Integrity 2010, appointments to the CAG often do not support its independence and may be based on non-professional criteria, such as political, family-based or personal loyalties. The CAG's audit reports are usually ignored or only given superficial attention by the government. Furthermore, according to the report, even though the CAG has been given a wider scope under the Public Audit Act of 2008 and has initiated useful audits of the finances of education and public health services, still, politically-sensitive issues are consistently avoided. For instance, the CAG has had no role in investigating controversial procurement issues, such as the BAE military radar or the Richmond emergency power generation contract. 

Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA): The TRA has taken several steps to avoid corruption. For example, the audit section of the income tax and VAT departments has integrated their systems in order to reduce corruption. The teams and staff are constantly changed so that the risks of either collusion or corruption with taxpayers are reduced. Hotlines have been established, and these are well used by the public. The TRA is known to work closely with the PCCB on corruption cases.

Ombudsman's Office: In 2001, the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRGG) replaced the Permanent Commission of Inquiry. Citizens can lodge complaints at the CHRGG which deals with human rights abuses and the contravention of principles of administrative justice. As such, the Commission functions as an Ombudsman institution that makes non-binding recommendations to the state. The CHRGG can also instigate investigations on its own. Furthermore, it advises and educates on issues of human rights and good governance. The CHRGG is not independent from the Office of the President (which cannot be investigated by the CHRGG), and it does not have the capacity to cover the whole country, although funding has recently increased significantly. According to Global Integrity 2010, the CHRGG is sometimes influenced by political and personal incentives, such as personal and professional loyalties, but also possibly exposed to some abuses of power. Moreover, according to the report, the appointments are sometimes made based on political considerations, and appointed individuals may sometimes have clear professional loyalties. Global Integrity 2010 outlines that the government often ignores the findings of the CHRGG or only gives them superficial attention, particularly if they concern politically sensitive issues.

Ethics Commission (EC): The EC is the implementing institution of the Public Leadership Code of Ethics, enacted in 1995. The EC handles asset disclosures and is to ensure that elected politicians and public servants do not engage in illegal or unethical activities. Under the law, members of government are required to file annual reports on statements of assets, which are available to the public only under limited circumstances. However, some assets are exempt from disclosure and many government officials simply do not disclose their assets. The EC can instigate investigations upon receiving a justified and relevant complaint. However, this process has been criticised for being problematic, because the complaint must be justified by the EC before it is able to access the evidence. Complaints cannot be filed anonymously.

E-Governance: E-Governance is relatively well developed in Tanzania and all ministries have own websites from which information can be obtained. For additional information consult the home-pages of Tanzanian ministries as well as the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) and Zanzibar Investment Promotion Agency (ZIPA).

Whistle-Blowing: In law, both civil servants and private sector employees who report cases of corruption are protected from retaliation and other negative consequences (Section 54 of the 2007 Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act). However, according to Global Integrity 2010, this protection is not upheld in practice, and whistleblowers often face substantial negative consequences. The Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) has the mandate to provide and maintain the hotline service to which corruption can be reported. The PCCB also provides an online complaint form which allows citizens to report corruption; however, it very rarely reacts on complaints within a reasonable time period and initiates the necessary investigations. According to a REPOA 2008 study, the key problem regarding whistle-blowing in Tanzania, is that people do not know how and where to report corruption. The study refers to the Afrobarometer 2006, in which only 3% of the respondents in the household who had witnessed a corrupt act committed by a public official had actually reported it. The same survey confirms that the reason for not reporting a crime is of the fear of negative repercussions.

Public Procurement: The Public Finance Act and the Public Procurement Act (PPA) have strengthened the possibilities of oversight by the Auditor General in public procurement and finances. By law, major procurements require competitive bidding and strict formal requirements limit the extent of sole sourcing. Unsuccessful bidders can instigate an official review of procurement decisions and challenge the concrete procurement decision in court, according to Global Integrity 2010. Contractors must register in order to participate in tenders, and a list of registered contractors is distributed to all tender boards in order to prevent the use of non-registered companies. Although government procurement is not entirely transparent, the Tanzanian government has carried out comprehensive reforms in its public procurements system. In 2004, the government passed the PPA which was followed up by a revision in May 2005. The PPA aims to increase the transparency of Tanzania's Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA), and to provide a margin of preference for local tenders to enhance the participation of local companies in public procurement processes. Tender notices and procurement legislation can be found on the website of the PPRA. Apart from this, newspapers, particularly state-controlled papers, carry a constant stream of tender announcements. Thus, according to Global Integrity 2010, in practice major procurements are effectively advertised, and sufficient time is allowed for bidders to respond to tender advertisements. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the procurement law could be questioned, since in practice companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations, such as bribery, are not prohibited from participating in future procurement bids. Furthermore, in the UNCAC Implementation Review 2010, it is stated that public procurement in Tanzania suffers from lack of capacity at both implementing and oversight level.

General Comments on Anti-Corruption Initiatives: Tanzania has a comprehensive body of laws, regulations and oversight agencies intended to prevent, investigate and sanction corrupt practices. The legislation should be adequate to deal with corrupt activities at all levels. However, as the Warioba Report made clear, it is the failure to enforce these rules, or the wilful circumvention of them, and the weakness of the institutions set up to deal with corruption, that is responsible for the current situation. Furthermore, while a number of the recommended reform efforts are ongoing, many of these initiatives are of a long-term nature and will have little impact on short-term success in fighting corruption. Finally, while the government has dismissed some corrupt civil servants and a few senior officials, and is strengthening some anti-corruption regulations and institutions, there has been a general perception in the country that the actions taken since publication of the Warioba Report have been insufficient in terms of reducing corruption. Lack of coordination between public institutions as well as with civil society and the private sector cause problems in the anti-corruption efforts of Tanzania.