According to the US Department of State 2011, the Angolan business environment is one of the most difficult in the world, aggravated by pervasive corruption, cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, and underdeveloped financial system. This perception is supported by the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012, according to which, corruption and inefficient government bureaucracy are among the greatest constraints on foreign companies operating in Angola. The country performs poorly across most institutional indicators covered by the report. Companies investing in most sectors in Angola have to deal with highly corrupt and inefficient government institutions, often favouring local companies through patronage networks. Corruption and maladministration work as a disincentive for foreign investment in sectors outside oil and mining, and the economy thus suffers from low levels of diversification. High levels of corruption and inefficiency keep small Angolan companies in the informal sector. Companies operating in the formal sector risk facing uncompetitive practices, costly bureaucratic procedures and vested interests. In the World Bank & IFC Enterprise Surveys 2010, over 41% of service companies report that they must compete against unregistered or informal companies. The use of petty bribes, locally known as gasosas, penetrates most business activities in both rural and urban areas. Thus, according to the World Bank & IFC Enterprise Surveys 2010, over 49% of the surveyed companies expect to make informal payments to 'get things done', and 76% identify corruption as a major constraint on their business operations in the country.

The government has set up several state credit funds to support small Angolan companies, such as the (now-liquidated) Agricultural and Fisheries Credit Bank (CAP) and the Development Bank of Angola (BDA). However, these institutions have been rife with poor governance and misappropriation of funds. The Economist Intelligence Unit's Angola Country Risk 2007 reports that the financial support offered by these funds allegedly followed a pattern of channelling oil money to favoured companies owned by high-ranking figures or to projects with strong political connections. Public procurement is a corruption-prone area, and it is occasionally reported that high-level government officials receive substantial kickbacks from private companies in exchange for lucrative government contracts, according to the US Department of State 2010. Angola also performs poorly in relation to the ethical behaviour of companies in interactions with public officials, politicians and other companies as well as in favouritism of government officials when deciding upon policies and contracts, as assessed by the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012. According to the report, public funds are commonly diverted to companies, individuals, or groups due to corruption. Due to these reasons, companies are recommended to use a specialised public procurement due diligence tool in order to help mitigate the costs and risks of corruption involving public procurement processes in Angola.

According to Global Witness 2009, it is common for government officials and civil servants to hold positions in private companies alongside their official posts, often resulting in conflicts of interest. This phenomenon is problematic for international companies as foreign investors are often required, or at least encouraged, to partner with Angolan companies, many of which turn out to be front organisations for government officials whose integrity and accountability are frequently questioned by observers. A 2009 report by Africa Files cites the example of Thales-Sadissa joint-venture through which the head of the Angolan state oil company and the country's ambassador to France have entered into a EUR multi-billion partnership with the French defence company Thales to supply communications equipment to the Angolan military, despite the Angolan legislation forbidding any such participation. This example demonstrates the ease with which Western multinationals promote corruption in Angola, as a pre-requisite for entering into business deals with the government. For these reasons, companies are generally advised to consult with experienced attorneys, to develop and implement integrity systems, and to carry out extensive due diligence before committing funds or when already doing business in the country.

Cumbersome bureaucracy is a major constraint on business operations in Angola. This perception is, among others, emphasised by the US Department of State 2011, according to which, low civil-service salaries and a proliferation of bureaucracy and regulations present opportunities for rent-seeking and encourage corruption. Complicated procedures and long bureaucratic delays could eventually tempt companies to seek faster service and approval by paying gratuities and facilitation payments. Companies surveyed in the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012 perceive government administrative requirements to be quite burdensome - with inefficient government bureaucracy identified as the second largest constraint on foreign companies operating in Angola. Moreover, companies also report that government policy-making is fairly opaque and that government officials usually favour well-connected companies and individuals when deciding on policies and contracts. Commercial regulations can be ambiguous and inconsistent, and the lack of transparency increases start-up and overall operational costs. In addition, according to the World Bank & IFC Doing Business 2012, Angola performs poorly in relation to registering property, enforcing contracts and trading across borders. Especially, when importing and exporting goods and registering property, a company can expect to go through much slower procedures than the regional averages for Sub-Saharan Africa.

The government has established the National Private Investment Agency (ANIP), an investment promotion agency mandated to assist investors and facilitate new investment in Angola. The government has also set up the Companies' Portal (in Portuguese), which functions as a one-stop shop for investors with the aim of simplifying the investment process and reducing registration times for companies. According to the World Bank & IFC Doing Business 2007-2008, the portal is directly responsible for reducing the time required to start a company in Angola by two months between 2007 and 2008. However, according to other observers, the effect of these business-friendly measures has been limited in other areas due to the lack of authority over line ministries, which must still approve licences, permits and other requirements. In Luanda, this problem has been overcome by authorising the provincial government to organise and distribute documents to agencies involved in water and electricity inspections of construction projects. Moreover, the World Bank & IFC Doing Business 2008-2009 reports that among the reforms introduced between 2008 and 2009, mandatory electronic filing of social security for companies with more than 20 employees made it easier to pay taxes. The land registry was digitalised, accelerating procedures needed to transfer property. Trade across borders was expedited with a customs improvement programme that streamlined procedures and lowered trade times and costs.

Enforcement of contracts is highly problematic in Angola, as illustrated by the World Bank & IFC Doing Business 2012. The settlement of commercial disputes through Angolan courts is time-consuming and unreliable due to inefficiencies and a highly politicised and corrupt judiciary. As a result, most companies avoid taking commercial disputes to court, according to the US Department of State 2011. Furthermore, court rulings often favour local companies. Companies surveyed in the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012 report that the judiciary is not independent from political influences of members of government, citizens or companies. In relation to legal options for resolving commercial and investment disputes, companies should note that Angola is not a member to some of the largest conventions in that area, such as the New York Convention 1958, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG). However, the government has approved the Voluntary Arbitration Law that provides the legal framework for non-judicial resolution of commercial disputes and is a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which provides dispute settlement assistance. Access the Lexadin World Law Guide for a collection of legislation in Angola.

Corruption Issues in Angola's Oil and Mining Industries

Oil and diamonds comprise the vast majority of Angola's exports, and several foreign investors are involved in Angola's extractive industries. Angola is Africa's largest oil producer and has joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 2007. The oils sector accounts for over 50% of Angola's GDP and over 90% of export revenues and over 80% of government revenues. An increasing number of Chinese companies have established themselves in oil and mining, and they are often engaged as sub-contractors in the many large construction projects financed by Chinese oil-backed loans to the Angolan government. Foreign investors in the oil sector should prepare themselves to operate on an uneven playing field characterised by government institutions notorious for high levels of corruption, patronage, inefficiency, and contract-breaking, as illustrated by the Bertelsmann Foundation 2006. This environment poses a challenge to investors, as contracts are not easily enforced through the Angolan judiciary.

The capital-intensive oil sector benefits relatively few people as government revenues from oil production are not distributed equally. The Angolan government has borrowed USD billions in oil-backed loans and continues highly unsustainable spending practices. This has allowed President Dos Santos to establish 'a state within a state', financed by flows from the Angolan central bank and the state oil company, Sonangol. Most of Sonangol's income is diverted to the ruling elite through complex offshore financial systems involving a multitude of subsidiaries and accounts in tax havens. The high oil revenues are also used by the government to control the already weak political opposition, as, when the situation requires it, it buys political support from MPs and other high ranking public officials. A detailed 2011 study by Global Witness of the Angolan government's misappropriation of oil revenues shows that none of Sonangol's income remains is independently accounted for, with frequent differences in government ministries responsible for the money. According to this study, there are also reports on the disappearance of USD millions if not billions paid by foreign oil companies in signatory bonuses in return for drilling rights.

Angola has not subscribed to the principles of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which set a global standard for companies in the extractive sector to publish what they pay to governments, and for host governments to disclose what they receive from these companies. The government has in the past discouraged extractive companies from disclosing details on their payments to Sonangol. Under pressure from international institutions, however, some progress has been made regarding Sonangol, which now publishes details on oil licensing competition and allows international audits. However, some observers suggest that the changes have only shifted the patronage system from the income side of Sonangol to the expenditure side, which includes kickbacks in procurement, the awarding of contracts to politically controlled companies, over-billing and the sale of state assets below market value. Despite the increase in available information about the bid rounds for oil exploration and production blocks, Revenue Watch Institute Angola profile illustrates that the processes by which local companies are granted equity stakes in oil consortia and companies are awarded sub-contracts, remain largely opaque.

Nevertheless, according to the Human Rights Watch Transparency and Accountability in Angola 2010, the government has significantly increased the transparency of oil revenues. For example, the Ministry of Finance has published the details of oil production by oil block on its website (in Portuguese), and the government has disclosed massive signature bonus payments since 2004. The ministry publishes detailed monthly data on oil production and oil exports, as well as the revenues that accrue to the government from those sales. According to the report, the website has significantly increased transparency in government oil revenues and, to a lesser degree, diamond revenues.

Currently, the Angolan diamond sector, amid the partial cleanup of the oil industry, represents a new instrument for illegal income for high-level figures. In fact, despite the high volume of production, tax revenues from the diamond sector remain low, allegedly due to under-reporting of official diamond production. The discrepancy between officially registered diamond production and estimates of the real diamond production is immense, indicating high levels of illegal mining and trade with diamonds. According to the Revenue Watch Institute Angola profile, the government has started publishing monthly data on diamond production and revenues, but these are not disaggregated between extracting companies. The level of transparency in the sector is therefore still very low, as indicated by the US Department of State 2010, typified by the National Diamonds Company (Endiama) who did not make public its audits. Foreign diamond companies are forced into joint ventures with the state-owned Endiama and a range of minor local companies. These domestic companies are mostly run by political allies and/or insiders.

Individual Corruption

The Angolan judicial system is characterised by understaffing, inefficiency and corruption, according to the US Department of State 2010. This image of the judiciary is also painted by Freedom House 2011, according to which, the courts are hampered by a lack of training and infrastructure, a large backlog of cases, and corrupt practices.

Moreover, among other problems is the fact that only few municipal courts are functioning, and cases end up in the provincial courts characterised by a substantial backlog of cases. As a result, traditional or informal courts are utilised, according to the Freedom House 2011.

Business Corruption

The World Bank & IFC Doing Business 2012 and the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012 illustrate that Angola's courts are not sufficiently efficient and are subject to political influences of members of government, citizens and companies. Similarly, the US Department of State 2011 reports that the Angolan judicial system lacks capacity and efficiency. Legal fees are high, and most companies avoid taking commercial disputes to court. Furthermore, court officials are underpaid and often accept bribes in order to expedite cases.

The World Bank & IFC Enterprise Surveys 2010 reveals a remarkable distrust among companies towards the effectiveness and fairness of the Angolan justice system. Commercial contract enforcement through the judicial system is notoriously slow - almost double the regional average.

Political Corruption

According to Freedom House 2011 and the US Department of State 2010, the judiciary is widely corrupt and subject to extensive executive and political influence. Also, the Bertelsmann Foundation 2010 portrays the judicial system as highly dependent on and suffering from interference by high-ranking politicians. The fact that several sources criticise the judiciary's independence in practice should be viewed in the light of this institution's formal accountability to the Ministry of Justice. The Supreme Court has little to no influence, and mainly serves the desire or need of high-level figures for legitimacy.

However, at the same time, the Freedom House 2010 points out that some courts have occasionally ruled against the government.

Frequency

World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012:
- Business executives give the independence of the judiciary from influences of members of government, citizens, or companies a score of 2.4 on a 7-point scale (1 'heavily influenced' and 7 'entirely independent').

- Business executives give the efficiency of the legal system for private companies to settle disputes and to challenge the legality of government actions and/or regulations a score of 2.5 and 2.5 respectively on a 7-point scale (1 'extremely inefficient' and 7 'highly efficient').

The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business 2012:
- Enforcing a commercial contract in Angola takes 1,011 days, requires 86 procedures, and costs over 44% of the claim on average.

The World Bank & IFC: Enterprise Surveys 2010:
- 23.6% of companies identify the legal system/conflict resolution as a major constraint.

- 23.7% of companies surveyed believe that the court system is fair, impartial and uncorrupted.

Individual Corruption

Corruption remains widespread within the Angolan police. Among the main reasons for this, according to the US Department of State 2010, is the low salary of police officers, which leads to the practice of supplementing income through extortion and solicitation of bribes from the public. The same source reports that in cases of complaints received by the National Police, this has sometimes led to formal punishment of perpetrators within the police force, including dismissal. However, the government has not yet established formalised mechanisms to expedite investigations and punish alleged offenders, and it rarely discloses publicly the results of internal investigations.

Business Corruption

Companies should note that extortion by Angolan police officers on major commercial routes in cities is routine, as indicated by the US Department of State 2010. This is further corroborated by the World Bank & IFC Enterprise Surveys 2010, which reveals that roughly three-quarters of the surveyed companies pay for security in Angola, while just under one-third of these companies identify crime, theft and disorder as major constraints on their business operations in the country. Companies surveyed by the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012 report that the police cannot be consistently relied upon to enforce law and order.

Political Corruption

According to the Partnership Africa Canada 2007, police corruption in special reserve zones, such as major mining areas, is rampant. According to the report, the police have turned the illegal miners into a profitable private business by institutionalising corruption in their daily interactions. Thus, the police operate unchecked in major cities and extract bribes from motorists and others. Some high-ranking police officers have been found to be directly involved in this system as Patrocinadors - facilitators and protectors of the illegal trade with diamonds - and share the profits with illegal miners, Garimpeiros. Diamond smugglers are also known to benefit from the questionable integrity of police officers by bribing them at check points and airports to overlook diamonds in their luggage.

According to Global Integrity 2010, the law enforcement agencies are not protected from political interference. Similarly, appointments to the law enforcement agencies are often based on criteria other than professional, such as party loyalties. As a result of this, some law enforcement officials also enjoy protection from criminal investigations.

In October 2009, the head of the finance division of Kwanza Sul provincial police was detained on charges of corruption by the National Criminal Investigation Department (DNIC). The DNIC cited extraordinary charges and salary payments to deceased and retired police agents as a basis for detainment, according to the US Department of State 2009.

Frequency

World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012:
- Business executives give the reliability of police services a score of 3.5 on a 7-point scale (1 'cannot be relied upon to enforce law and order' and 7 'can be relied upon to enforce law and order').

The World Bank & IFC: Enterprise Surveys 2010:
- 77% of companies surveyed pay for security.

- 28% of companies identify crime, theft and disorder as major constraints to doing business in the country.

Business Corruption

The issuing of licences generally suffers from non-transparent and time-consuming bureaucratic procedures, although new licensing regulations in some sectors and the establishment of the Companies' Portal, a one-stop shop for investors, illustrate a degree of political will on the part of the government to simplify investment procedures to the benefit of companies. According to the World Bank & IFC Enterprise Surveys 2010, companies report that they expect to give gifts in order to obtain access to public utilities, such as water and electricity connections. A considerable number of companies also cite that they frequently give gifts in return for licences necessary for establishing and operating a business, such as construction permits and operating licences. The payment of bribes to public officials in charge of issuing permits and licences is fuelled largely by a costly and time-consuming bureaucracy.

Another area for corrupt practices is the business inspections conducted by government officials. Thus, Global Integrity 2010 reports that business inspections by government officials to ensure public health and safety standards are in practice carried out in an arbitrary and ad-hoc manner, and bribes are paid by companies in return for favourable treatment or expedited processing.

Political Corruption

In April 2010, five high-level immigration officials were convicted with fraud and corruption by the government. These officials were suspected of embezzling funds and accepting bribes in immigration services in exchange for USD 300 to USD 1,000, according to the US Department of State 2010. However, in September 2010, the Constitutional Court overturned the the convictions - citing an unfair trail. To further complicate matters, the press reported of a conflict of interests in the ruling - with the president of the court and one of its judges owning the law firm that defended the accused.

In February 2010, ten officials were arrested at the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank on charges of embezzling over USD 100 million, according to a 2010 article by Reuters.

Frequency

World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012:
- Business executives give the government administrative requirements (permits, regulations, reporting) in Angola a score of 2.1 on a 7-point scale (1 'burdensome' and 7 'not burdensome').

The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business 2012:
- Companies can expect to go through 8 administrative steps to start a business, taking an average of 68 days at a cost of 119% of GNI per capita.

- Building a warehouse in Angola requires a company to go through an average of 11 administrative procedures, taking an average of 321 days and costing 180% of income per capita.

The World Bank & IFC: Enterprise Surveys 2010:
- 54% of companies expect to give gifts to obtain an electrical connection.

- 50% of companies expect to give gifts to obtain a water connection.

- 48% of companies expect to give gifts to obtain a construction permit.

- 39% of companies expect to give gifts to obtain an operating licence. All are above the average for Sub-Saharan Africa.

Individual Corruption

Poor Angolans struggle with unclear entitlement to the land they occupy. According to the Bertelsmann Foundation 2010, internally displaced persons upon returning home found other individuals farming the land they previously owned. Earlier people occupying land were protected under the civil code even if they lacked official title but with the introduction of a new land bill passed by the parliament in August 2004 the land tenure of most urban dwellers was rendered illegal. These poor people often only hold sale and purchase documents for the plots they occupy, but these are not recognised by the authorities. In urban areas such as Luanda, many Angolans who bought land on the informal market from people without title rights thus face eviction by the government and demolition squads. Critics argue that the Land Law 2004 does not adequately address the issue of entitlement to land and that property rights remain weak and unclear. Furthermore, the above report also states that Angola continues to suffer from land grabs by the ruling class, even though a land law protecting pastoral communities forbids third parties to use areas inhabited or used for cultivation, cattle breeding or the population's livelihood. Afrol News reported that, in March 2009, the Angolan government evicted thousands of persons to make place for urban development, leaving more than three thousand families homeless in Lubango city, in the Huíla province. This elucidates the uncertainty of property rights.

Business Corruption

Enforcement of property rights is notoriously weak in Angola, resulting in considerable uncertainty over land issues, as illustrated by the Bertelsmann Foundation 2010. In fact, unclear land titles and ill-defined property rights are considered as constraints on conducting business within land administration for companies, according to the US Department of State 2011. This environment could eventually trigger opportunities for corruption, with land administration officials extracting bribes from companies.

Political Corruption

The Bertelsmann Foundation 2010 points out that the lack of transparency and corruption on a political level within land administration in Angola continues to be a problem. According to the report, the country still suffers from land grabs by high-level figures, although a land law protecting pastoral communities forbids third parties to use areas inhabited or used for cultivation, cattle breeding or the population's livelihood. Thus, senior government members, generals and even the president have taken ownership of former coffee or sisal plantations, and have engaged in large-scale cattle farming, particularly in southern Angola. However, there seems to be a marginal improvement in the situation with the implementation of decentralisation mechanisms, which give traditional authorities some power to defend their communities' land use rights, but abuses of power still occur.

Frequency

The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business 2012:
- Registering property requires a company to go through an average of 7 administrative procedures, which take an average of 184 days and cost 3.2% of the property value, three times slower but three times cheaper than the regional average.

World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012:
- Business executives give the protection of property rights in Angola, including financial assets, a score of 2.7 on a 7-point scale (1 'very weak' and 7 'very strong').

Business Corruption

According to Global Integrity 2010, in practice, tax laws are almost never enforced uniformly and without discrimination in Angola, and some well-connected individuals consistently avoid paying taxes. Furthermore, companies report serious corruption issues in dealings with tax officials. The tax administration is also notorious for its inefficiency, leaving ample scope for tax evasion through bribery, according to Global Integrity 2010.

Frequency

The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business 2012:
- A medium-sized company must make an average of 31 payments each year to the tax authorities at a total tax rate of 53% of profits, and dealings with them take an average of 282 hours per year.

The World Bank & IFC: Enterprise Surveys 2010:
- 34% of companies expect to give gifts in meetings with tax inspectors. Small firms are nearly twice as likely as large firms to be expected to give gifts.

Business Corruption

Companies encounter cumbersome and non-transparent procedures when clearing imports through the ports and customs services of Angola. Global Integrity 2010 reports that customs and excise laws are not always enforced uniformly or without discrimination in practice, and some that groups are more likely to evade customs and excise laws due to their connections. The report assesses that although some improvements have taken place within the customs administration in recent years, customs service continues to be a barrier to economic growth in Angola.

Similarly, according to the World Bank & IFC Enterprise Surveys 2010, a significant proportion of companies in Angola report that they expect to give gifts in order to obtain import licences. The customs administration's propensity towards corruption is fuelled largely by costly and time-consuming import and export procedures, which increase the likelihood of successfully extracting bribes and facilitation payments from importers and exporters.

Political Corruption

The US Department of State 2011 reports that bureaucracy and port inefficiencies complicate customs procedures, particularly imports, for companies in Angola. Most imports pass through the Port of Luanda, which is considered to be plagued by inefficiency, corruption, and high costs, according to the USAID Trade Assessment Angola 2003. The cumbersome and costly bureaucracy in customs administration means that Angola performs poorly in trading across borders on the World Bank & IFC Doing Business 2012, with imports and exports taking longer to clear customs than the regional average. This is a major obstacle for diversifying the Angolan economy, as it deters investors from sectors with potentially lower returns on investments than the oil and diamond sectors.

Frequency

World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012:
- Business executives give the efficiency of customs procedures (formalities regulating the entry and exit of merchandise) in Angola a score of 2.7 on a 7-point scale (1 'extremely inefficient' and 7 'extremely efficient').

The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business 2012:
- A standard export shipment of goods requires 11 documents and takes 48 days at a cost of USD 1,850 per container.

- A standard import shipment of goods requires 8 documents and takes 45 days at a cost of USD 2,690 per container.

The World Bank & IFC: Enterprise Surveys 2010:
- 36% of companies that trade identify customs and trade regulations as a major constraint on their business activities.

- 55% of companies expect to give gifts to obtain an import licence, considerably higher than the Sub-Saharan average of 17%.

- It takes 11 days on average to clear imports from customs.

- It takes 6.7 days on average to clear customs for exports.

Business Corruption

Awarding concessions and contracts in the oil sector follows an opaque pattern, with government officials holding considerable discretionary powers in the awarding of contracts and with the state-owned oil giant Sonangol's mandate to approve all major procurement contracts in the oil sector. Although laws regulating the procurement process exist, they are inadequately enforced and procurement officials often demand bribes or take kickbacks when awarding contracts. For example, according to the US Department of State 2010, there were credible reports of high-level officials receiving substantial kickbacks from private companies awarded government contracts in 2010. This is confirmed by the World Bank & IFC Enterprise Surveys 2010 in which a significant number of companies report that they expect to give gifts in order to secure government contracts, with the average gift amounting to a colossal 10% of the contract value. 

According to the Chr. Michelsen Institute 2007, there are several problems related to procurement in Angola, including weaknesses in the legal framework and lack of enforcement, inefficiency and costly procedures, as well as weak audit and anti-corruption mechanisms. According to Freedom House 2007, awarding of contracts financed by foreign assistance has been non-transparent, especially at the sub-contractors' level.

Companies are recommended to use a specialised public procurement due diligence tool in order to mitigate the corruption risks associated with public procurement in Angola.

For more information on public procurement in Angola, see 'Public Anti-Corruption Initiatives' in the Initiatives section.

Political Corruption

Corruption is widespread in public procurement and functional control mechanisms are absent in most ministries and levels of government. According to the US Department of State 2009, there is a lack of transparency in the government's procurement, and media sources have reported on an incidence where government officials allegedly received bribes in exchange for accepting large housing project contracts to build one million homes. Government ministers and other high level officials often own interests in companies regulated by their respective ministries, as there are no laws regulating conflict of interest. Public officials in charge of awarding contracts work within a highly politicised public administration and receive little training in public procurement functions. According to Global Integrity 2010, Angolan procurement law presents some serious flaws, as it does not address procurement officials' conflict of interests, nor does it provide for a system to scrutinise their assets. Moreover, no debarment system exists for companies found guilty of misfeasance in the procurement process.

For more information on public procurement in Angola, see 'Public Anti-Corruption Initiatives' in the Initiatives section.

Frequency

World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012:
- Business executives give the diversion of public funds to companies, individuals, or groups due to corruption a score of 2.0 on a 7-point scale (1 'very common' and 7 'never occurs').

- Business executives give the favouritism of government officials when deciding upon policies and contracts a score of 1.9 on a 7-point scale (1 'always show favouritism' and 7 'never show favouritism').

The World Bank & IFC: Enterprise Surveys 2010:
- 58.5% of the companies surveyed expect to give gifts to secure a government contract

- The average value of a gift expected to secure government contract as reported by the companies surveyed is 9.8% of the contract. This is three times higher than the Sub-Saharan average.

Business Corruption

Companies should note that corruption is rife in both the oil and diamond sectors, which are characterised by poor and inefficient regulations, political interference and state-owned companies with monopolistic powers that are often used as instruments for diverting funds to political elites. Foreign investors are usually required to enter into joint ventures/production sharing agreements with state-owned giants in both sectors (Endiama in the diamond sector and Sonangol in the oil sector) that enjoy access to subsidised capital. However, these local companies are frequently accused of being at the centre of the systematic diversion of public funds in Angola. For further information on corruption in Angolan extractive industries, see this profile's special page on the oil and mining sectors.

Companies report that bribery is not uncommon when dealing with environmental inspections in Angola. For instance, Global Integrity 2010 reports that business inspections by government officials to ensure public environmental standards are often carried out in an arbitrary and ad-hoc manner, and bribes are sometimes extracted from companies in return for favourable treatment or expedited processing

Political Corruption

The Angolan government has for many years enjoyed a booming income from the Angolan oil sector, which is completely dominated by the 100% state-owned oil company, National Fuel Society (Sonangol). The government extracts USD billions from Sonangol's activities each year, which is claimed to act as a disincentive for government investments in other sectors. Some members of the political elite allegedly uses Sonangol as an instrument for diverting funds for personal gain and observers estimate that a large proportion of its earnings never reach the Angolan treasury. According to the Revenue Watch Institute Angola profile, however, transparency in the management of oil revenues has improved significantly since 2002, due to pressure from international institutions.

For further information on corruption in Angolan extractive industries, see this profile's special page on the oil and mining sectors.

• Legislation: The Law of the High Authority Against Corruption provides for the president to propose the creation of an anti-corruption agency, but not much progress has been made in this regard. The Penal Code 1886 indirectly deals with corruption committed by public officials, and it criminalises attempted corruption, while the Law of Crimes Against the Economy criminalises extortion as well as active and passive corruption. In March 2010, the Parliament passed the Public Probity Law, which obliges all government officials to declare their wealth, including revenues, bonds and shares or any other kind of property and valuables, domestic or abroad. The law covers entities holding public posts, either elected or nominated, managers of public property, in charge of armed forces, national police, public institutions, as well as executive organs and magistrates and other public officials. The new legislation will regulate the use of public goods and funds in Angola and is designed to help the concerned authorities to better fight corruption and manage public money, according to a June 2010 article by Angola Press. According to the Revenue Watch Institute Angola profile, the Law on State Secrecy 2002 and Law on National Security neutralised the positive effect on transparency in the discharge of government tasks brought about by the Law on Access to Administrative Documents of 2002. These laws in fact limit the types of documents citizens can have access to and grant the government the authority to imprison anyone who releases information that could be regarded as damaging to Angolan state interests and to censor news that deal with corruption. Furthermore, the laws also target multinational oil companies, providing for prosecution if these choose to release data on their transactions in Angola. Since the passage of these laws, the government has voluntarily disclosed many of its oil receipts thereby shedding some light on the sector. However, much remains to be done, as the focus on lack of transparency has now moved to the lower level of sub-contractors, according to the Revenue Watch Institute's Angola profile. Access the Lexadin World Law Guide for a collection of laws in Angola.

• Government Strategies: The government's most successful initiative in Public Financial Management (PFM) and fiscal transparency has been the information system, which covers all the provinces and has helped strengthen budget execution and reporting, and information sharing on PFM issues. The system will be also extended to include some autonomous bodies. The effectiveness of the system, however, is limited because foreign credit lines and the state-owned oil company's (Sonangol) large quasi fiscal activities are not executed through the system. The government has also established, with the World Bank, a programme that monitors most government expenditures as they occur.

• Anti-Corruption Agency: Angola does not have a functional, politically independent anti-corruption institution with a mandate to investigate and prosecute corruption cases. The establishment of a High Authority against Corruption (HAAC) in 1995 was intended to produce an independent public institution functioning in conjunction with the National Assembly in order to prevent corruption in public institutions. However, the HAAC has yet to begin functioning, as progress with the institutional setup has been slow and no anti-corruption strategy has yet been formulated. This is supported by Global Integrity 2010, according to which, the agency exists only in law.

• Office of the Ombudsman: The Office of the Ombudsman was established in 2005. The Ombudsman is elected for a four-year term. The functions of the Ombudsman include issuing recommendations to the concerned institutions. The Ombudsman has achieved encouraging results especially in the field of prison conditions and excess of custody. A further expansion of the scope of action is slowed by the lack of qualified personnel. Global Integrity 2010 is somewhat critical towards the efficiency of this institution as it is not sufficiently protected from political interference in practice, and the current Ombudsman is considered by some groups as politically influenced. Furthermore, the appointments to the agency do not always support its independence, and individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties. The Ombudsman reports to the Commission of the National Assembly on a biannual basis, but these reports are not publicly available, which is in line with the general low level of access to politically sensitive information in Angola. The government does not usually act on the findings of the Ombudsman and often ignores or gives superficial attention to its reports, according to Global Integrity 2010.

• Auditor General: The legal provisions are in place for audit and control systems of public finances. However, the Court of Accounts, Angola's supreme audit office, has only recently started to audit the accounts of some ministries and provincial governments, and it generally struggles under a politically controlled environment and large unaccounted funds. The Court has been more active than before, is supported by South Africa's auditor general. According to Global Integrity 2010, the appointments to this agency do not sufficiently support its independence from the executive; thus, appointments are sometimes based on political considerations, and individuals appointed may have clear party loyalties. Furthermore, in practice, the head of the agency is not protected from removal without relevant justification. According to Global Integrity 2010, the government usually ignores or gives superficial attention to the audit reports. The findings and recommendations of the agency are unknown to the public, not discussed in parliamentary debates, and often not implemented by the executive.

• Integrated Financial Management System (SIGFE) is a system implemented by the government, with international assistance, to track all government revenues and expenditures at both national and local level. The SIGFE has been highlighted as a major step for government accountability and to fight corruption. However, according to the Human Rights Watch Transparency and Accountability in Angola 2010, SIGFE's efficiency as an anti-corruption measure could be questioned. According to the report, among others, a United States-based consultancy, Development Alternatives (DAI), has noted that there are serious problems with SIGFE, including the fact that government spending information by some agencies is not yet in SIGFE and could be subject to error, as well as lack of adequate reporting. Nor is the information in the SIGFE system public, so there is no way for Angolans to assess how the government uses public funds. Given this system's limitations, the report assesses that SIGFE cannot yet be seen to provide adequate tracking of expenditures, let alone to serve as an effective tool for combating corruption.

• E-Governance: The government has established the Portal of the Republic of Angola (in Portuguese), where citizens and companies can access various forms and guidelines for obtaining public services. The government has also set up the Companies' Portal (in Portuguese), which functions as a one-stop shop for investors with the aim of simplifying the investment process and reducing registration times for companies. According to the World Bank & IFC Doing Business 2007-2008, the portal is directly responsible for reducing the time required to start a company in Angola by two months between 2007 and 2008. In addition, the World Bank & IFC Doing Business 2008-2009 reports that introduction of mandatory electronic filing of social security for companies with more than 20 employees has made it more convenient to pay taxes. Land administration has also been digitalised enabling faster procedures for transferring property.

• Public Procurement: The Angolan government is still in the process of developing an e-procurement system (in Portuguese), where companies will be able to access information on public tenders and bidding opportunities. There are no reports on when the e-procurement system will be operational. Foreign investors should note that the Promotion of Angolan Private Entrepreneurs Law 2003 grants Angolan-owned companies preferential treatment in government tenders for goods and services as well as in public works contracts. In law, major procurements require competitive bidding, but no strict formal requirements limit the extent of sole sourcing, according to Global Integrity 2010. Unsuccessful bidders cannot ask for an official review of the bidding process but can challenge the concrete procurement decision in the courts. A significant problem within public procurement is the fact that the awarding of contracts in the oil sector suffers from low levels of transparency and, generally, competitive bidding is not adequately enforced in the Angolan public procurement regime. According to the Chr. Michelsen Institute 2007, the Angolan procurement regime needs major improvements and is considered a high-risk area for investors. In contrast, the African Development Bank Group 2008-2009 reports that some progress has been made in the oil bidding practices, and that the last bidding round for exploitation acreage in 2006 was praised internationally for its transparency in both the bidding and the awarding process. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of procurement processes could be questioned, as companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations, including bribery, are not prohibited from participating in future procurement bids. Furthermore, the government is not required by law to publicly announce the results of procurement decisions, which, according to the World Bank, is not an indication of a transparent procurement system, as cited by Global Integrity 2010.

• Whistle Blowing: According to Global Integrity 2010, no legislation protects whistleblowers from retaliation, neither in the public nor in the private sector.

• General Comments on the Public Anti-Corruption Initiatives: Angola's legal and institutional anti-corruption framework is generally reported to be poor. Insufficient safeguards against corruption exist within the state apparatus, the lack of checks and balances have created an environment, where grand corruption thrives in the form of diversion of oil revenues and only few have been held accountable. However, a general trend towards more transparency regarding both the amount of oil revenue and the expenditure of state budget represents an encouraging development. Moreover, the existent institutional deficiencies, including in relation to anti-corruption mechanisms, need to be viewed in the light of the past civil war. On the other hand, the ruling party has penetrated the Angolan political system and public administration and critics describe it and its support network as largely self-interest and self-serving. Due to the politicisation of the judiciary, the Parliament and law enforcement agencies, a few public anti-corruption initiatives in Angola have proved effective in containing the country's high levels of corruption.

• Media: Despite the Angolan Constitution (in Portuguese) guaranteeing freedom of expression and the press, the media continue to operate in a restricted environment. The provision of news is dominated by state-owned media, and independent journalists are frequently harassed, especially outside the capital, where a few independent and critical publications can be found. The government has tried to co-opt or buy-off the private media. Despite constitutional guarantees providing for civil liberties, in November 2010, the parliament passed a new state security law enabling the detention of persons  who 'insult' the Republic of Angola or the president in 'public meetings or by disseminating words, images, writings or sounds'. According to Freedom House 2011, this clause leaves the door open for arbitrary dentention of political opponents and does not meet international standards. These provisions seriously limit press freedom and lead to self-censorship among journalists, who have seen colleagues arrested for reporting on corruption and the self-enrichment of the national elite. This kind of harassment is especially prevalent in the provinces, where public scrutiny is less effective. Even though the law provides for public access to government information, the government is selective in providing it. Reporters Without Borders 2010 ranks Angola 106th out of 178 countries, while the Freedom House 2011 ranks Angola 143th out of 196 countries and describes Angola's press environment as 'not free'.

• Civil Society: Freedom of assembly and association is guaranteed by the constitution. However, according to the Chr. Michelsen Institute 2006, civil society organisations (CSOs) working with governance and transparency in Angola are small and weak, operate with a limited membership and are highly dependent on foreign funding. Moreover, according to the US Department of State 2010, NGOs working with sensitive issues such as corruption have reported government interference in their activities throughout 2010. In addition, CSOs are frequently threatened with closure or prosecution when they speak out about revenue accountability or corruption, as reported by the Revenue Watch Institute. In 2007, the prominent anti-corruption activist Sarah Wykes was arrested by the Angolan security forces, according to the US Department of State 2009. Authorities charged her with unspecified crimes against state security during her visit to the Cabinda province to research transparency in the oil sector for Global Witness. Subsequently, the authorities released Wykes on a bail of USD 2000, according to a 2007 press release by Transparency International. NGOs are also lamenting a lack of adequate information about the processes and procedures involved in the extraction, marketing and sale of oil, which limits their ability to follow the money streams and to question the management of oil revenues.

• Episcopal Conference Commission for Justice and Peace (ECCJP): The ECCJP's main task is to produce reports for the Bishops Conference to present to the government. Since 2005 it has focused on the analysis of the national budget, with the aim to increase transparency in oil and diamonds revenues. The ECCJP also advocates for Angola to join the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI). In pursuing its goal, the ECCJP is leveraging its access to government channels and the fact that it represents a significant part of the nation's voting population. The ECCJP's work can be inscribed in a general trend of churches being more involved in the political debate on good governance and human rights.

The websites listed below provide useful facts on Angola as well as contacts and tools for companies operating in Angola:

• International Finance Corporation: Global SME Toolkit
  Guide to sustainable business management practices for SMEs.
• Business Fighting Corruption
  An online resource centre for business on collective action to avoid corruption which contains a guide and resources for partnerships with companies and other stakeholders to fight against corruption.
• CIA World Factbook: Angola Profile
• World Bank: Angola Data Profile

Sources for further reading:

• US Department of State: Investment Climate Statement - Angola 2011.
• Freedom House: Freedom in the World - Angola 2011.
• All Africa: 'Fifty Years of Continued Uprisings', 01 Dec. 2011.
• US Department of State: Human Rights Report - Angola 2010.
• The Bertelsmann Foundation: Transformation Index - Angola 2010.
• Global Integrity: Angola Country Report 2008.

UNCAC Status: Signed 10 December 2003. Ratified 29 August 2006.

Status on UNCAC Implementation
This field describes the country's status on the United Nations Convention against Corruption. Please note any declarations and reservations made upon ratification. The list of signatories can be found on the UNODC website. Read more about the UNCAC.

Other Relevant Conventions or Treaties:

• AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption: Signed 22 January 2007. Not Ratified.
  Read Transparency International's summary and assessment of the convention.
• United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime: Signed 13 December 2000. Not Ratified.
  Read Transparency International's summary and assessment of the convention.

Transparency CPI: 2011: 168/182 (Score: 2)

Transparency CPI
This field consists of the score for the country in question on the Corruption Perceptions Index from Transparency International as well as its ranking.

World Bank CORR Index (-2.5 - +2.5): 2010: -1.33

World Bank Corruption Index
This field consists of the score for the country in question on the 'Control of Corruption' indicator in the World Bank Governance Research Indicator Country Snapshot (GRICS): 1996-2010.

OECD Country Risk Classification (0-7): 2011: 6

Country Risk Classification
The classification of countries by risk category has the aim of providing OECD countries with a basis for calculating the premium interest rate to be charged to cover the risk of non-repayment of export credits. Countries are placed in risk categories 0 - 7, with 0 being the lowest risk category and thus the least expensive. Conversely, premium group 7 is the highest risk category. Each classification is comprised of 2 components: 1) an assessment of the country's economic/financial situation, and 2) its overall political stability. Access the complete list of OECD Country Risk Classification figures.

Data Verification:

Publication date: December 2011

Data verified by: Global Advice Network

General Information Sources

• The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business 2012.
• World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012.
• US Department of State: Investment Climate Statement - Angola 2011.
• Freedom House: Freedom in the World - Angola 2011.
• US Department of State: Human Rights Report - Angola 2010.
• Reuters: 'Angola ruling party to look into graft allegations', 9 August 2010.
• Human Rights Watch: Transparency and Accountability in Angola 2010.
• The Bertelsmann Foundation: Transformation Index - Angola 2010.
• Transparency International: Global Corruption Report 2009.
• Global Witness: Private oil firm's shareholders have the same names as top Angolan government officials, 4 August 2009.
• The IOL: 'Angola Election 2012', 24 September 2009.
• Africa Files: 'Corruption pre-requisite for government contracts', 24 September 2009.
• Business Monitor Online: 'Presidential Election Delayed -Social Tensions Raising', 15 September 2009.
• The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business: Reforms in Africa 2008-2009.
• Global Integrity: Angola Country Report 2008.
• US Department of State: Human Rights Report - Angola 2008.
• Open Budget Initiative: Open Budget Index 2008.
• Lexadin: The World Law Guide - Legislation Angola 2008.
• Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative: Oil and Governance Report: A case study of Chad, Angola, Gabon, Sao é Principe 2008.
• Global Voices: 'Angola: MPLA wins over 80% of Votes and Secures 191 Seats', 17 September 2008.
• The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business: Reforms in Africa 2007-2008.
• The Economist Intelligence Unit: Angola Country Risk 2007.
• Council on Foreign Relations: Angola Strategy: Prioritizing U.S.-Angola Relations 2007.
• Partnership Africa Canada: Diamond Industry Annual Review - Republic of Angola 2007.
• Chr. Michelsen Institute: Budget State and People - Budget Process, Civil Society and Transparency in Angola 2007.
• Global Witness: Angola: Time to Walk the Talk on US Anti-Kleptocracy Initiative, 26 September 2007.
• Development Today: 'Angola Corruption. Sida freezes SEK 40m', No. 4-15, 2007.
• New York Times: 'Nowadays, Angola Is Oil's Topic A', 20 March 2007.
• The Bertelsmann Foundation: Transformation Index - Angola 2006.
• The World Bank & IFC: Enterprise Surveys 2006.
• Human Rights Watch: 'Angola: New OPEC Member Should Tackle Corruption Not Critics', 15 December 2006.
• The World Bank: Angola, Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability 2005.
• John McMillan: The Main Institution in the Country is Corruption: Creating Transparency in Angola 2005.
• Global Witness: 'Time for Transparency - Coming clean on oil, mining and gas revenues', 2004.
• African Economic Outlook: Angola.
• Revenue Watch Institute: Angola.

Corruption Levels Sources

Judicial System

• The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business 2012.
• World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012.
• US Department of State: Investment Climate Statement - Angola 2011.
• Freedom House: Freedom in the World - Angola 2011.
• US Department of State: Human Rights Report - Angola 2010.
• The Bertelsmann Foundation: Transformation Index - Angola 2010.
• US Department of State: Human Rights Report - Angola 2009.
• Fund for Peace: Angola Country Profile 2007.
• Transparency International: Global Corruption Report 2007.
• The World Bank & IFC: Enterprise Surveys 2006.

Police

• World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012.
• US Department of State: Investment Climate Statement - Angola 2011.
• Freedom House: Freedom in the World - Angola 2011.
• US Department of State: Human Rights Report - Angola 2010.
• Global Integrity: Angola Country Report 2008.
• Fund for Peace: Angola Country Profile 2007.
• Partnership Africa Canada: Diamond Industry Annual Review, Republic of Angola 2007.

Licences, Infrastructure and Public Utilities

• The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business 2012.
• World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012.
• US Department of State: Investment Climate Statement - Angola 2011.
• Freedom House: Freedom in the World - Angola 2011.
• US Department of State: Human Rights Report - Angola 2010.
• Reuters: 'Angolan president warns new govt against corruption', 8 February 2010.
• Global Integrity: Angola Country Report 2008.
• Financial Times: 'The new colonialists', 17 November 2007.
• Financial Times: 'Angolan loan admission casts new light on ties with China', 19 October 2007.
• Financial Times: 'Angola shows it will not be China's puppet', 27 August 2007.
• The World Bank & IFC: Enterprise Surveys 2006.
• Business in Africa & Daniel Silva: 'Portuguese building firms eye Angola', 19 April 2006.

Land Administration

• The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business 2012.
• World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012.
• US Department of State: Investment Climate Statement - Angola 2011.
• Freedom House: Freedom in the World - Angola 2011.
• US Department of State: Human Rights Report - Angola 2010.
• The Bertelsmann Foundation: Transformation Index - Angola 2010.
• Afrol News: 'Angola evictions create humanitarian crisis', 29 March 2010.
• Fund for Peace: Angola Country Profile 2007.
• Human Rights Watch: 'Angola: Thousands Forcibly Evicted in Postwar Boom', 15 May 2007.
• The World Bank & IFC: Enterprise Surveys 2006.

Tax Administration

• The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business 2012.
• World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012.
• US Department of State: Investment Climate Statement - Angola 2011.
• Global Integrity: Angola Country Report 2008.
• The World Bank & IFC: Enterprise Surveys 2006.

Customs Administration

• The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business 2012.
• World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012.
• US Department of State: Investment Climate Statement - Angola 2011.
• US Department of State: Human Rights Report - Angola 2010.
• Global Integrity: Angola Country Report 2008.
• The World Bank & IFC: Enterprise Surveys 2006.
• Crown Agents: 'New Customs Code for Angola', 15 November 2006.
• USAID: Trade Assessment: Namibia and Angola 2003.

Public Procurement and Contracting

• World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012.
• US Department of State: Investment Climate Statement - Angola 2011.
• Freedom House: Freedom in the World - Angola 2011.
• US Department of State: Human Rights Report - Angola 2010.
• African Development Bank Group: Angola - Country Strategy Paper Update 2008-2009.
• Global Integrity: Angola Country Report 2008.
• Chr. Michelsen Institute: Budget, State and People - Budget Process, Civil Society and Transparency in Angola 2007.
• Freedom House: Countries at the Crossroads - Angola 2007.
• The World Bank & IFC: Enterprise Surveys 2006.
• The World Bank: Angola, Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability 2005.
• Global Witness: Time for Transparency - Coming clean on oil, mining and gas revenues 2004.

Environment, Natural Resources and Extractive Industry

• Global Integrity: Angola Country Report 2008.
• Chr. Michelsen Institute: Budget, State and People - Budget Process, Civil Society and Transparency in Angola 2007.
• Partnership Africa Canada: Diamond Industry Annual Review, Republic of Angola 2007.
• Revenue Watch Institute: Angola.

Public Anti-Corruption Initiatives Sources

• Human Rights Watch: Transparency and Accountability in Angola 2010.
• Reuters: 'Angola ruling party to look into graft allegations', 9 August 2010.
• Angola Press: 'Probity Law to bring about more transparent governance-govt official', 30 June 2010.
• AllAfrica: 'Angola: Public Probity Law Entails Property Declaration', 11 June 2010.
• Angola Press: 'MPs hail Administrative Probity Law', 5 March 2010.
• Business Week: 'Angolan Lawmakers Approve Law Aimed at Curbing Government Graft', 5 March 2010.
• The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business 2010.
• The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business: Reforms in Africa 2008-2009.
• African Development Bank Group: Angola - Country Strategy Paper Update 2008-2009.
• Global Integrity: Angola Country Report 2008.
• UN Economic and Social Council: Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 2008.
• Angola Press: Ombudsman Explains Office Functioning 2008.
• The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business: Reforms in Africa 2007-2008.
• The International Monetary Found: Article IV Consultation 2007.
• Council on Foreign Relations: Angola Strategy: Prioritizing U.S.-Angola Relations 2007.
• Chr. Michelsen Institute: Budget, State and People - Budget Process, Civil Society and Transparency in Angola 2007.
• The International Budget Project: Open Budget Initiative 2006.
• The World Bank: Angola, Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability 2005.
• National Human Rights Institutions Forum: Appointment of New Justice Ombudsman Sparks Concern 2005.
• ISS & Monograph: Combating Organised Crime in Angola, June 2001.
• Revenue Watch Institute: Angola.

Private Anti-Corruption Initiatives Sources

• US Department of State: Investment Climate Statement - Angola 2011.
• Freedom House: Freedom in the World - Angola 2011.
• Freedom House: Freedom of the Press - Angola 2011.
• US Department of State: Human Rights Report - Angola 2010.
• The Bertelsmann Foundation: Transformation Index - Angola 2010.
• Reporters Without Borders: Angola Country Profile 2010.
• Freedom House: Freedom of the Press Index 2010.
• US Department of State: Human Rights Report - Angola 2009.
• Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative: Oil and Governance Report: A case study of Chad, Angola, Gabon, Sao é Principe, 2008.
• Transparency International: 'TI joins call demanding the release of anti-corruption campaigner in Angola', 21 February 2007.
• Inge Amundsen & Cesaltina Abreu: Civil Society in Angola: Inroads, Space and Accountability 2006.
• Human Rights Watch: Angola: New OPEC Member Should Tackle Corruption Not Critics, 14 December 2006.
• Revenue Watch Institute: Angola.